The effects of social capital on wage income: a multi-country analysis by Hermann, Zoltán & Kopasz, Marianna
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2011) 
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY Vol.2 (2011) 2, 3–26
The effecTs of social capiTal on wage 
income:  a mulTi-counTry analysis1
Zoltán Hermann2–marianna KopasZ3 
AbstrAct We analyze the effect of individual social capital on wage income in 
European countries. A number of studies have already tested the earnings effects 
of social ties but the majority of them have been limited to small samples and/or 
to certain occupations. The major contribution of the paper is its assessment of the 
earnings effects of social capital in a multi-country context using a large international 
dataset, the EU-SILC. We estimate individual level earnings regressions for a 
pooled sample and for individual countries as well. Three indicators are used to 
measure social capital: memberships in voluntary organizations, the frequency of 
contacts with friends and frequency of contacts with relatives. Results indicate a 
significant positive association between social capital and wage income both for 
the pooled sample and the majority of the countries individually. The effect of 
social capital is stronger for post-socialist countries than for other countries while 
it is almost missing in the Nordic countries. Comparing the effects of memberships 
in voluntary organizations, friendship and kinship ties provides some support for 
the strength of weak ties hypothesis.
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 inTroDucTion
It is a widely held view both in sociology and economics that human capital 
is the most important factor in determining life chances in Western societies. 
However, in the past several decades a number of studies have demonstrated 
the role of social connections in life chances, including chances on the labor 
market. 
This paper is concerned with the effects of social capital on wage income 
in European countries. More specifically, we seek to answer the following 
questions: First, whether social capital has an effect on individual income. 
Second, whether weak ties (remote friends, acquaintances) have a stronger 
effect on income than strong ties (relatives, close friends) do. Or, stating it 
differently; does the strength of ties matter, as theory suggests. Third, we 
inquire whether the income effect of social connections is more pronounced 
in post-socialist countries than in countries with different pasts. 
A number of studies have already tested the earnings effects of social ties. 
The majority have been limited to small samples and/or to certain occupations, 
such as managers (Boxman et al. 1991; Barros 2006), or to the self-employed 
(Gomez and Santor 2001). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt 
to assess the earnings effects of social capital on nationally representative 
samples in a multi-country context. We estimate individual level earnings 
regressions for 26 countries: the EU-25 countries (except Malta) and two non-
EU members: Norway and Iceland. We use data from the 2006 wave of the 
EU-SILC (Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) survey.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: In the next 
section we firstly outline the theoretical background of our research and 
then formulate our hypotheses. We also provide a brief overview of research 
findings on the earnings effect of social capital. In Section 3 we describe the 
survey and the data and then detail econometric specifications. In Section 
4 we discuss the measurement of social capital and specify the explanatory 
variables of the model. Our results are presented in Section 5. We also discuss 
some problems with the estimation of returns on social capital here. Finally, 
Section 6 summarizes the main findings.
2. TheoreTical BacKgrounD anD hypoTheses
In this paper, we treat social capital as being individual level resources. 
Following Lin’s (2001) definition, social capital is conceived as being 
“resources embedded in one’s social network, resources that can be accessed 
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or mobilized through ties in the networks”. Social capital thus conceived 
has been hypothesized to cause a number of positive effects, such as better 
educational attainment, jobs with higher earnings, higher occupational status, 
entrepreneurial success, physical or mental health, and subjective well-being, 
etc. In this paper, we focus on the income effects of social capital.
Social capital theories provide different answers to the question of what the 
sources of social capital are, or what factors influence the benefits accruing 
to an individual from/the utility of social capital. Broadly, three different 
perspectives can be distinguished.
In his seminal paper, Granovetter (1973) lays the emphasis on the strength 
of social ties; i.e. whether ties are weak or strong. The strength of a tie in his 
approach depends on the amount of time, emotional intensity, the intimacy and 
the reciprocal services which characterize the tie. Accordingly, acquaintances 
are usually labeled as being weak ties, while relatives and close friends are 
strong ties. Granovetter (1973) argues that weak ties are more likely than 
strong ties to be sources of information about job openings. This argument is 
based on the fact that one’s close friends tend to know each other and have 
social networks similar to each other. Therefore, information on jobs held by 
close friends is often redundant. On the contrary, one’s acquaintances are less 
likely to know each other and will tend to have different social networks. Thus, 
the individual’s acquaintances are more likely to have access to information 
different to that which the individual receives. 
Reformulating Granovetter’s strength of weak ties hypothesis, Burt (1992; 
1997) argues that what really matters is not the strength (or weakness) of 
ties but the network position of individuals. The theory of structural holes 
claims that whether a tie is strong or weak it generates benefits when it is a 
bridge over a structural hole; that is, when it connects such parts of the social 
network (clusters) that are otherwise disconnected. In this theory, the benefits 
of social capital result from the diversity of information and the brokerage 
opportunities created by the lack of a connection between separate clusters in 
the social network. Burt (1992) assumes that structural holes have effects on 
individuals getting better positions or rewards in organizations.
The social resources theory focuses on the resources embedded in one’s 
social network (Lin et al. 1981). Lin et al. (1981) argue that it is not the 
weakness of a tie (or its bridging potential) in itself that conveys advantages. 
Job searching through social ties will be most successful when the contact 
is a person of higher status. Whether the job seeker can reach a high status 
contact depends on both his/her social position (initially family background, 
but eventually educational and occupational achievements) and his/her use 
of-weak ties. 
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A number of studies have already tested the earnings effects of social 
capital. Some of these studies choose human capital theory as a starting point. 
This line of research focuses on the relationships between human capital, 
social capital, and income. For the majority of studies, theories by Bourdieu 
(1986) and Coleman (1988) serve to provide a framework. In an influential 
paper, Boxman, De Graaf, and Flap (1991) attempt to determine the relative 
contribution of human capital and social capital to income generation. More 
recently, Barros (2006) formulated a similar research question. Buerkle and 
Guseva (2002) hypothesize that social capital gained while in school has an 
independent effect on income.
Another stream of research focuses on the impact of job seekers’ social ties 
on labor market outcomes. These studies have been inspired by Granovetter’s 
(1973) theory of the “strength of weak ties” and by an extension of this theory 
by Lin and his collaborators (Lin et al., 1981). The central hypothesis of 
this research is that the use of weak ties as a job seeking method provides 
better jobs in terms of higher prestige and/or higher income (e.g. Bridges and 
Villemez, 1986; Wegener, 1991).
In this paper, we intend to contribute to the latter line of research. However, 
our investigation differs from the former in some important respects. First, we 
focus only on the income effects of social capital (i.e. the other labor market 
effects of social ties are ignored). Second, we will argue that social capital can 
affect income not only through the job finding method (formal vs. informal) 
but through other mechanisms as well. In this study, we therefore present 
three hypotheses. The first two refer to the income effects of social capital, 
while the third is a comparative hypothesis that specifies in which countries 
we expect the effect of social capital to be most pronounced. 
h1: The more network resources an employee has access to, the higher 
his/her income will be. To put this simply, social capital has a positive 
effect on wage income.
To explain why social network resources generate benefits in terms of higher 
income at least three different mechanisms can be outlined. First, network 
resources facilitate the flow of information. Social ties – especially with 
those in a strategic network position and/or with those of high social status 
– can provide an individual with useful information about job opportunities 
otherwise unavailable. A related advantage is that the information provided by 
social connections is richer in content than the information acquired through 
impersonal mechanisms (Ganovetter, 1995). Second, social ties may exert 
influence on those persons who play an important role in decisions on hiring 
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or promotions (Lin, 1999). Third, having access to social network resources 
reassures decision-makers (e.g. recruiters) that the individual can provide 
additional resources beyond his/her personal capabilities which can be useful 
to the organization. In other words, social network resources may function as 
certifications of the individual’s “social credentials” (Lin, 1999). In addition, 
as Flap et al. (1986) point out, social capital not only helps an individual 
obtain a better job and obtain it fast, but also helps the individual preserve it 
for a longer time. 
Previous empirical research provides evidence for the earnings effects of 
social capital. In a study on the income attainment of Dutch managers, Boxman 
et al. (1991) find that social capital has a positive effect on income. They also 
conclude that social capital and human capital can act as substitutes for each 
other. In the income attainment process social capital helps at any level of 
human capital, but human capital does not make a difference at the highest 
level of social capital (Boxman et al. 1991). Recently, Barros (2006) replicates 
these findings using a sample of Portuguese cooperative managers. 
h2: weak ties have a stronger effect on income than strong ties do. 
Granovetter (1973) argues that weak ties are more likely to have access 
to non-redundant information. Thus, weak ties are more often the sources 
of information about opportunities. In principle, both strong and weak ties 
may span a structural hole and thus generate information as well as control 
benefits (Burt 1992). Yet weak ties are more likely to be a bridge than strong 
ties. Given that, potentially, there are more bridges among an individual’s 
weak ties than among his/her strong ties, we can hypothesize that weak ties 
have greater effects on earnings than strong ties do. In what follows, we use 
the terminology introduced by Granovetter (1973) as ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties 
can be more easily operationalized than ‘structural holes’. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that weak ties are a common source 
of finding jobs and thereby play an important role in matching workers and 
jobs (Granovetter 1973). Examining professional, technical, and managerial 
workers, Granovetter (1974) also found that weak ties lead to better jobs in 
terms of income than strong ties do. Motivated by Granovetter’s findings, 
much empirical work has been done to validate the effects of weak ties on 
income. The results, however, are generally not supportive. Though, Bridges 
and Villemez (1986), and Marsden and Hurlbert (1988) find that individuals 
that obtained their jobs through weak ties have higher wages on average, the 
relationship is insignificant once control variables are introduced. Wegener 
(1991) finds, however, that weak ties lead to higher status jobs only in the 
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case of individuals who formerly held high status jobs (whereas individuals 
who formerly held low status jobs do not benefit from weak ties).
Nevertheless, it is important to note that what the above studies estimate 
is the effect of the job finding method (formal method vs. informal channel - 
weak ties or strong ties) on income. To re-state this, they test the hypothesis 
that weak ties offer superior job information that leads to better jobs (Tassier, 
2006). These studies focus on ties that were actually used in the (current) job 
finding process without much attention to the total volume of social capital 
(Boxman et al., 1991). This approach to measuring the effect of weak ties on 
income therefore underestimates the effect (Tassier, 2006). Beyond the job-
finding process, there are many ways in which social connections can generate 
benefits in terms of higher income (Boxman et al., 1991). For example, social 
connections may also have helped one receive his/her previous job – that 
then launched a successful career trajectory (Buerkle and Guseva, 2002). 
Boxman et al. (1991) therefore take a step further when they measure the total 
volume of social capital (i.e. not only mobilized social capital) in assessing its 
influence on income. In their previously-mentioned empirical study they find 
that social capital, measured by the number of memberships in elite clubs and 
contacts with people in other organizations, has a substantial direct influence 
on income. 
Finally, we note that some authors have recently proposed and tested new 
hypotheses on the income effects of social ties. Growiec and Growiec (2007) 
hypothesize that the relationship between the amount of time invested in the 
building of bridging social capital (i.e. weak ties) and earnings is an inverse 
U-shaped relationship, while the effect of bonding social capital (i.e. strong 
ties) on earnings is negative. Through analyzing Polish data they find that 
bridging social capital (i.e. weak ties), proxied by the number of friends with 
whom the individual have frequent contact4, has a positive and significant 
effect on earnings. Interestingly, they find no significant correlation between 
the number of frequently contacted acquaintances and earnings. According to 
their results, bonding social capital (i.e. strong ties), proxied by the number 
of family members with whom the individual has frequent contact, exerts a 
negative effect on income.
4  We note that the number of friends with whom one has frequent contact is at least as much 
a proxy for bonding ties as it is for bridging ties. Based on the homophily principle (i.e. that 
people prefer to interact with others who share the same social characteristics), frequently 
contacted friends are more likely to represent ‘bonding’ than ‘bridging’ ties.
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h3: network resources in general matter more in post-socialist countries 
than in countries with no history of state socialism. we therefore expect 
that the earnings effects of social networks will be most pronounced in 
post-socialist societies. 
This hypothesis rests on a study by Sik (1995) on the scope and role of 
network capital5 in communist, capitalist and post-communist societies. The 
study argues that network capital is more widespread under communism than 
capitalism for two major reasons. The first reason is the cultural legacy, as well 
as historical and political developments. The other reason is that communist 
countries are characterized by being under considerable socioeconomic 
pressure (e.g. permanent shortages of goods, over and under-regulation of 
the redistributive system, etc.), which provides an environment favorable 
to the maintenance and further development of network capital. Within the 
shortage economies of state socialism social connections are a key element 
of individual and household strategies of survival (see, e.g. Kolankiewicz, 
1996). Sik (1995) goes further and argues that networking becomes at least 
as widespread in post-communism as when under communism due to the 
great inertia characterizing the networks on the one hand, and the growing 
uncertainty associated with the transformation process on the other (see also 
King, 2000). 
3. DaTa anD moDel specificaTion 
We use data from the 2006 wave of the EU-SILC (Community Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions) survey. The data cover 26 countries; the EU-
25 countries (excluding Malta), plus Norway and Iceland. The total number of 
respondents who were asked to answer the questionnaire module concerning 
their social ties is 377,462. Our estimation sample is restricted to 155,873 
cases, in accordance with the research question and due to data limitations. 
Since we analyze the impact of social capital on wage income, we excluded 
from the sample those who in the previous year: (1) had no wage income; or 
(2) worked less than 6 months; (3) had more self-employed income than wage 
income, and those; (4) where data was missing on educational attainment. 
The dependent variable in this study is yearly employee gross cash (or near 
5  “Network capital” is conceived as being a crucial form of social capital that includes long term 
altruistic kin relations, balanced reciprocity, lasting and multipurpose patron-client relations, 
etc. (see Sik, 1995).
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cash) income in the prior year (more precisely, the natural logarithm of yearly 
income). Income data do not include social transfers. We have no information 
on whether income data refer to the main job alone or multiple jobs, but 
income from self-employment is not included in the dataset.
The econometric specification employed is based on a modified version 
of the standard Mincerian wage equation. We deviate from the standard 
specification in using educational attainment dummies instead of years of 
schooling and in adding social capital and a broad set of control variables and 
country fixed effects. In order to explore the impact of social capital on wage 
income, we estimate the following model:
(1)
where W denotes wage income for the previous year, S is educational 
attainment, E is potential work experience, O, F and R are measures of social 
capital; membership in organizations, and the intensity of relationships with 
friends and relatives, respectively, and X is a vector of control variables. α, 
β, γ and δ are estimated parameters and ε is the residual. C denotes country 
dummies and η-s are their coefficients. Index j stands for countries, while 
i denotes individuals. Note that the country fixed effects control for any 
differences in the level of income and/or social capital between countries. 
The identification of the effect of social capital relies solely on within-country 
variation, though the effect is constrained to be the same for the whole sample 
(i.e. for all countries).
Besides the pooled model, we also estimate separate regressions for each 
country in order to explore differences in the effect of social capital variables. 
Country regressions follow the same specification as the pooled model 
(excluding country fixed effects). To check robustness these estimates also 
reveal whether social capital effects are common in most countries, or present 
in only a few. 
The parameters of main interest are γ o, γ f and γ r. In the semi-log specification 
the value of these multiplied by one hundred can approximately be interpreted 
as a percentage change in income. Since social capital is measured using 
dummy variables (see below), this means that individuals with social capital 
of a given level on average earn approximately γx100 percent more than 
individuals in the reference category (i.e. individuals with the lowest level of 
social capital), ceteris paribus.
In order to test Hypothesis 3 we re-estimated the pooled model supplemented 
with interaction terms between social capital variables and a post-socialist 
country dummy:
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(2)
where P denotes post-socialist countries and the π-s are the coefficients of 
the interaction terms.
As wage equations usually produce different results for men and women, 
all models are estimated separately. Taking into account the SILC sampling 
procedures, probability weights are used to ensure that the sample represents 
the target population, with the sum of weights equal for each country and 
standard errors clustered at the household level (the primary sampling unit in 
most of the countries) – allowing for a correlation among the residual terms 
within households.
4. measuremenT of Key VariaBles 
 
4.1 measures of social capital 
Ideally, both the potential capacity of social capital (accessed social capital) 
and actual use of social capital (mobilized social capital) should be measured 
(Lin, 2008). Here we have to restrict ourselves to measuring only the potential 
capacity of social capital. To operationalize strong and weak ties one would 
need multiple indicators. This criterion, however, is very rarely met in a 
multi-country survey. 
Three types of social capital measures are employed in the analysis. The 
first measure is the intensity of contacts with relatives (this refers not only to 
the person that the individual is in contact with most often). This appears to be 
an appropriate proxy for the potential resources from strong ties an individual 
has access to. Unfortunately, no data is available on the number of relatives 
with whom the respondents keep contact. Further, we lack any information on 
other characteristics of the relationships. 
Another measure of social capital is the intensity of contacts with friends 
(here again, not only the person that the respondent contacts most often is 
considered). Since no additional information on friends is available from 
the survey we cannot draw a distinction between close friends (confidantes) 
and remote friends (although close friends should be treated as strong ties 
and remote friends as weak ties). This proxy thus measures partly strong and 
partly weak ties and is therefore not an ideal proxy for testing the strength of 
the weak tie hypothesis.
 10
is a vector of control variables. Į, ȕ, Ȗ and į are estimated parameters and İ is the residual. C 
denotes country dummies and Ș-s are their coefficients. Index j stands for countries, while i 
denotes individuals. Note that the country fixed effects control for any differences in the level 
of income and/or social capital between countries. The identification of the effect of social 
capital relies solely on within-country variation, though the effect is constrained to be the 
same for the whole sample (i.e. for all countries). 
Besides the pooled model, we also estimate separate regressions for each country in 
order to explore differences in the effect of social capital variables. Country regressions 
follow the same specification as the pooled model (excluding country fixed effects). To check 
robustness these estimates also reveal whether social capital effects are common in most 
countries, or present in only a few.  
The parameters of main interest are Ȗo, Ȗf and Ȗr. In the semi-log specification the value 
of these multiplied by one hundred can approximately be interpreted as a percentage change 
in income. Since social capital is measured using dummy variables (see below), this means 
that individuals with social capital of a given level on average earn approximately Ȗx100 
percent more than individuals in the reference category (i.e. individuals with the lowest level 
of social capital), ceteris paribus. 
In order to test Hypothesis 3 we re-estimated the pooled model supplemented with 
interaction terms between social capital variables and a post-socialist country dummy: 
 
(2) 
ijj jjijjij
r
jij
f
jij
o
ij
r
ij
f
ij
o
ijijijij
CXPRPF
PORFOEESW
HKGSS
SJJJEEED

 
¦
2
321log
       
 
where P d notes post- ocialist co ntries and th  ʌ-s are th  coefficients of the interaction 
terms. 
12 ZOLTÁN HERMANN–MARIANNA KOPASZ
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2011) 
The ‘intensity of contacts’ variables were coded into six categories in the 
survey. Since no significant differences were found between the categories of 
‘once a month’ and ‘once a year at least’, we merged the two categories into 
one. Thus we use five categories in the model: contact daily, weekly, several 
times a month, once a month or less frequently, and never (considering ‘once 
a month or less frequently’ as the reference category)6. Figure 1 and 2 present 
the distribution of population according to the intensity of contacts with 
friends and relatives. The figures reveal marked differences among countries. 
Contacts with friends and relatives are in general most frequent in Cyprus, 
Greece and the Scandinavian countries.
Membership in voluntary organizations appears to be a more appropriate 
proxy for weak ties than intensity of contacts with friends. An empirical study 
on voluntary organizations (Bekkers et al. 2004) provides evidence that the 
social networks of those who are members of voluntary organizations have 
better access to network resources than the social networks of non-members. 
Therefore, in the analysis, weak ties are proxied by the number of memberships 
in different types of voluntary organizations.
In the SILC survey respondents were asked about memberships in six types 
of voluntary organizations: political parties or trade unions, professional 
associations, churches and other religious organizations, recreational groups 
or organizations and ‘other groups or organizations’. We use the number of 
memberships in voluntary organizations as a proxy for weak ties. When 
calculating the number of organization memberships, we omitted churches 
and other religious organizations since our initial analysis revealed that these 
types of organizations behave differently to the other types (see in Section 
5.1 the detailed results on the different types of organizations). Further, as we 
cannot safely assume that the relationship between the number of organization 
memberships and income is linear, the number of organization memberships is 
operationalized as a set of dummy variables. Since the sample is quite unevenly 
distributed with respect to the number of organizations in which respondents 
are affiliated we use four categories in the analysis: no membership (reference 
category), membership in one, two or three or more types of organizations7. The 
distribution of the population according to organization membership for each 
country is displayed in Figure 3. Membership in voluntary organizations is most 
6  In the individual country regressions, the categories ’once a month or less frequently’ and 
‘never’ are also combined into one due to the small number of respondents reporting ‘never’.
7  In the individual country regressions, ‘two’ and ‘three or more types’ are also combined (into 
‘two or more types’) due to the small number of observations within the ‘three or more types’ 
category.
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common in the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. Post-socialist countries 
tend to cluster at the bottom of the list, except for Slovenia and Slovakia.25
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Figure 3 Membership in different types of voluntary organizations 
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4.2 control variables
According to human capital theory, the most important determinants of 
earnings are schooling and work experience. Schooling is measured by a 
set of dummy variables, since using years of schooling often proves to be 
a restrictive assumption (see e.g. Björklund and Kjellström, 2002), and if 
social capital is related to educational attainment, this could result in omitted 
variable bias. Experience is not observed directly in our data. In the absence 
of this, potential experience is calculated as age minus the country median age 
of reaching the educational attainment of the respondent.
Additional control variables are also included in the model in order to 
control for individual heterogeneity possibly correlated with both wages and 
social capital. To test the hypotheses, we estimated two variants of the wage 
equations: a base and an extended specification. In the base model, we control 
for labor market activity in the previous year and working hours (required as 
the dependent variable is yearly wage income). The base model further includes 
those demographic characteristics that are possibly related to both labor supply 
and social capital, such as sex, marital status, number of children, dummies 
for the country of birth and for citizenship, the size of the settlement in which 
the individual lives (population of either less than or more than 50000), and 
dummies indicating the missing values for the right hand side variables.
The second model (extended model) adds to the first dummies for economic 
sectors and occupation. The occupational dummies follow the classification 
of ISCO occupational categories into five groups, as suggested by O’Rourke 
and Sinnott (2001). The effect of these variables on the estimated impact of 
social capital is somewhat ambiguous. First, if social capital provides access 
to jobs in occupations or economic sectors with higher than average wages, 
the impact of social capital is underestimated when these additional control 
variables are included in the estimates, providing conservative estimates. 
Second, if there is a correlation between social capital and occupation and 
economic sector – beside any casual effect of social capital on the additional 
control variables – ignoring this can result in either upward or downwardly 
biased estimates of the impact of social capital on wages. For example, 
economic sector and occupation dummies can in part take on the unobserved 
effect of settlement size, due to the different economic characteristics of 
urban and rural areas. This could be important since the level of our observed 
social capital variables may well differ among metropolitan, medium-sized 
and small town and small village environments, but unfortunately we cannot 
directly control for settlement characteristics beyond distinguishing between 
settlements with more or less than 50000 inhabitants. Overall, the effect of 
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any social capital proxy will be considered robust only if it proves to be 
significant in both the base and the extended models.  
5.  resulTs  
 
5.1 results for the pooled sample
The results for the pooled sample are presented in Table 1. Coefficients 
for social capital variables are generally statistically significant and have the 
expected signs. The results for men and women are almost identical thus we 
will not discuss them separately.
Membership in voluntary organizations is positively associated with higher 
income. However, membership in more than one organization generally 
does not imply further increases in income compared to membership in only 
one organization. As expected, the coefficients are smaller in the extended 
models where the economic sector and broad categories of occupation status 
are controlled for. Altogether, organizational membership is associated with 
about a 2 to 6 percent income advantage.
Analysis of the distinct types of organizations reveals a considerable 
heterogeneity (Table 2). Membership in political parties or trade unions, 
professional associations, and in recreational groups is associated with 
significantly higher income. The effect of membership in charitable 
organizations is not robust and varies by gender: the coefficient is of a 
positive sign in the male subsample (though significant only in the base 
model) and negative in the female subsample (though significant only in 
the extended model). Membership in other organizations did not prove to 
be statistically significant. By contrast, membership in churches and other 
religious organizations (not included in the number of organizations variables 
in the basic model) comes together with lower income.
The cultivation of friendship relationships has a significant and positive 
effect on income (Table 1). Generally, more frequent contact with friends is 
associated with higher income (note that the reference category in the model 
is ‘once a month or less frequently’). However, the effect of daily contact is 
somewhat smaller than that of weekly contact.
The results for kinship ties is less unambiguous. The income effects of 
contacts with relatives differ by gender. In the male subsample, all coefficients 
are significant and of positive sign. In the female subsample, however, the 
income of respondents with contacts ‘several times a month’ and ‘never’ do 
not differ from those contacting their relatives monthly.
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Altogether, the results are in line with H1. Social capital indicators 
are positively associated with income, when controlling for individual 
characteristics.
Hypothesis 2 is more difficult to assess. First, the coefficients for the three 
social capital indicators are similar in magnitude, as opposed to H2. At the 
same time, the effect of contacts with relatives (a proxy for strong ties) seems 
to be less robust for the female subsample, which is in accordance with H2.
Table 1 Estimated coefficients for the social capital variables
men women
base model extended model base model extended model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
organizations: 1 type 0.0607*** 0.0449*** 0.0661*** 0.0384***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
organizations: 2 types 0.0506*** 0.0355*** 0.0393*** 0.0178***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
organizations: 3 or more types 0.0410*** 0.0296*** 0.0444*** 0.0269***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
friends: daily 0.0323*** 0.0233** 0.0391*** 0.0223**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
friends: weekly 0.0493*** 0.0406*** 0.0586*** 0.0454***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
friends: twice a month 0.0287*** 0.0229*** 0.0447*** 0.0307***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
friends: never -0.0702*** -0.0510*** -0.0852*** -0.0570***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
relatives: daily 0.0595*** 0.0459*** 0.0445*** 0.0285***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
relatives: weekly 0.0562*** 0.0453*** 0.0259*** 0.0139
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
relatives: twice a month 0.0393*** 0.0307*** -0.00630 -0.0118
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
relatives: never -0.0451*** -0.0327** -0.0163 -0.0079
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.021)
N 82130 82130 73719 73719
Adjusted R2 0.746 0.763 0.722 0.746
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2 Estimated coefficients for membership in distinct types of organizations
men women
base model
extended 
model
base model
extended 
model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political parties and unions
0.0312*** 0.0235** 0.0538*** 0.0364***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Professional associations
0.1120*** 0.0899*** 0.1520*** 0.1180***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Recreational organizations
0.0391*** 0.0280*** 0.0315*** 0.0125*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Charitable organizations
0.0284*** 0.0157 -0.0063 -0.0209**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Other organizations
0.0101 0.0039 0.0115 0.0020
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Churches and religious 
organizations
-0.0178** -0.0171** -0.0286*** -0.0262***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
N 82130 82130 73719 73719
Adjusted R2 0.746 0.763 0.723 0.747
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the effect of social capital is more pronounced in the 
post-socialist countries than in other EU countries. We tested this hypothesis 
by adding interaction terms between the social capital variables and the post-
socialist status of countries to the model. Estimation results are presented in 
Table 3. The significance of the interaction terms between the organization 
membership and the post-socialist country dummies indicates that membership 
in voluntary organizations has a greater effect on both female and male income 
in countries with state-socialist past than in the others. However, the organization 
effect exists for both groups of countries; i.e. results for the full sample are not 
only driven by post-socialist country status. Regarding the type of organizations, 
membership in professional associations and recreational organizations turns 
out to have a larger positive effect on income in post-socialist countries (results 
available from authors upon request).
The coefficients for ‘contacts with friends’ are also larger for post-socialist 
countries (Tale 3). Accordingly, friendship relationships tend to generate a 
higher income advantage in this group of countries. However, this holds true 
only if contacts occur on a daily or weekly basis. 
Regarding kinship ties, no difference can be found in the income effects 
between the two groups of countries. 
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In summary we can conclude that our findings support H3. Organization 
membership and friendship ties – the two indicators most likely to increase 
income – seem to have a stronger impact in post-socialist countries.
Table 3 Estimated coefficients for the social capital variables  
and interactions with post-socialist status
men women
base model
extended 
model
base model
extended 
model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
organizations: 1 type
0.0500*** 0.0369*** 0.0458*** 0.0246***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
organizations: 2 types
0.0440*** 0.0303*** 0.0264*** 0.0078
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
organizations: 3 or more 
types
0.0372*** 0.0267*** 0.0402*** 0.0245***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
friends: daily
-0.0262** -0.0290** -0.0061 -0.0163
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
friends: weekly
0.0214** 0.0157 0.0312*** 0.0229**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
friends: twice a month
0.0225** 0.0198* 0.0362*** 0.0265**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
friends: never
-0.0396** -0.0231 -0.0831*** -0.0591***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020)
relatives: daily
0.0502*** 0.0400*** 0.0430*** 0.0341**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
relatives: weekly
0.0473*** 0.0397*** 0.0335** 0.0246*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
relatives: twice a month
0.0369*** 0.0313*** -0.0084 -0.0133
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017)
relatives: never
-0.0302* -0.0189 -0.0280 -0.0221
(0.018) (0.017) (0.028) (0.027)
post-soc. x organizations: 
1 type
0.0402*** 0.0307** 0.0711*** 0.0490***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
post-soc. x organizations: 
2 types
0.0316*** 0.0257** 0.0554*** 0.0449***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
post-soc. x organizations: 3 
or more types
0.0176* 0.0141 0.0117 0.0063
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
post-soc. x friends: daily
0.1900*** 0.1710*** 0.1380*** 0.1200***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019)
post-soc. x friends: weekly
0.0733*** 0.0661*** 0.0665*** 0.0559***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016)
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post-soc. x friends: twice 
a month
0.0138 0.00607 0.0157 0.0067
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
post-soc. x friends: never
-0.1000*** -0.0917*** -0.0074 0.0038
(0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030)
post-soc. x relatives: daily
0.0195 0.0112 0.00251 -0.0175
(0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
post-soc. x relatives: 
weekly
0.0182 0.0101 -0.0331* -0.0369**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017)
post-soc. x relatives: twice 
a month
-0.0005 -0.0069 0.0023 0.0024
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
post-soc. x relatives: never
-0.0332 -0.0305 0.0249 0.0324
(0.031) (0.030) (0.045) (0.042)
N 82130 82130 73719 73719
Adjusted R2 0.747 0.764 0.723 0.747
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.2 results of individual country regressions
In order to explore possible heterogeneity in the effect of social capital 
variables and to test whether the results for the pooled sample were driven 
by a few exceptional countries, we repeated the estimations for each country 
separately. The results are summarized in Table 4. 
Membership in voluntary organizations has a positive and significant 
income effect in 22 of the 26 examined countries, though in some countries 
for males and in others for females only. Organization membership exerts a 
positive impact on male income in 20 countries, and on female income in 18 
countries. 
The effect of friendship relationships is positive and significant in 15 
countries. The earnings effect of kinship relationships varies substantially by 
country and gender. Positive coefficients are found for 13 countries; however, 
in 4 cases the effect is negative for women.  Only 3 countries, Finland, Norway, 
and Greece, show no sign of a positive social capital effect at all. In summary, 
results of individual country regressions provide strong evidence for H1.
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Table 4 Estimated coefficients for social capital variables: summary of country 
results
organizations friends relatives
men women men women men women
Austria ++ ++
Belgium +
Cyprus ++ ++ ++
Czech Republic ++ ++ ++ ++ – –
Denmark ++ – –
Estonia ++ ++ ++
Finland 
France ++ ++ ++ + ++ +
Germany ++ ++ ++ +
Greece – –
Hungary ++ ++ ++ ++
Iceland ++
Ireland ++ ++ ++
Italy ++ ++
Latvia ++ ++ + +
Lithuania ++ + + ++ ++ +
Luxembourg ++ + ++
Netherlands ++ ++ ++
Norway 
Poland ++ ++ ++ +
Portugal ++ ++ + +
Slovakia ++ ++
Slovenia ++ ++ ++
Spain ++ ++ ++ + ++ – –
Sweden ++
United Kingdom ++ ++ + +
++ / – – : robust positive / negative effect, + / – : less robust positive / negative effect
It is an eye-catching finding that in Scandinavian countries social capital 
either has no effect at all (Finland, Norway) or only organizational membership 
has an impact for either the male or the female subsample (Sweden, Iceland, 
Denmark). A possible explanation is that the labor markets of these countries 
lay great emphasis on educational qualifications and meritocratic recruitment, 
thereby leaving little scope for benefits from social connections to appear. An 
alternative explanation might be found in the high levels of social capital on 
average in these countries (see Figure 1, 2, and 3). The high average levels may 
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suggest that our indicators are less suitable for measuring the most important 
part of the true variation of social capital in these countries. Note that the 
results for Greece and Cyprus are also in line with this latter argument.
In order to assess Hypothesis 2, we can compare the number of countries 
with significant effects for the three indicators. The income effect of weak 
ties, measured by the number of organization memberships, proved to be 
significant in the case of 22 countries; and in 16 for both males and females. 
The frequency of contacts with friends, a variable somewhat closer to being 
a proxy for weak ties than for strong ties, has significant and positive income 
effects in 15 countries. The effect of friendship relationships is significant in 
both the male and female subsamples for 5 countries. 
Strong ties, measured by the intensity of contacts with relatives, have a 
positive and significant influence on income in fewer countries than weak 
ties do. Positive income effects for both females and males were found in 
only two countries (France and Lithuania); the effect is rather ambiguous for 
females. Hence, the results provide some support for the ‘strength of weak 
ties’ hypothesis (H2).
Regarding Hypothesis 3, country regressions confirm the results obtained 
for the pooled sample. The coefficients for organization memberships are 
significant for both genders in all the post-socialist countries. By contrast, 
of the 18 remaining countries there are only 7 to which the same applies. 
Further, with the exception of Estonia and Slovakia, friendship ties have a 
significant income effect in at least one gender in all post-socialist countries. 
Of the 18 remaining countries, it is in only 9 that the coefficients for ‘contacts 
with friends’ proved to be significant in at least one gender subsample. 
5.3 problems in the estimation of returns to social capital
So far we have shown that social capital is associated with higher income. 
However, whether this association can be interpreted as a casual effect is far 
from evident.
The first problem is that the causality between social capital and income 
could run both ways. It may be that people with higher incomes tend to have 
a higher propensity to live more active lives, and to join voluntary groups 
or organizations. Further, individuals with higher social positions and higher 
incomes are more likely to become members of certain types of organizations 
such as professional organizations. If participation in a voluntary organization 
requires a significant monetary contribution, those who already have high 
incomes are more liable to join the organization. Beyond budgetary constraints, 
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another problem is the time needed to join an organization. If participation in 
an organization is rather time consuming, then it is mainly those who spend 
less time working who would remain members. If membership in voluntary 
organizations is endogenous in this way, then estimates of organizational 
memberships can be biased upwards. 
A second concern is that the effect of social capital may be due to unobserved 
heterogeneity. Individuals may have certain unobserved characteristics (e.g. 
outstanding social or communication skills) that lead both to more social 
connections and to higher income. Since we cannot exclude the possibility 
of the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, the coefficients for social capital 
variables may be biased upwards. 
A third problem arises if social capital is the result of individual investment 
(in social relations), and if the investment decision is driven by costs and 
expected returns, analogously to human capital theory (Lin, 1999). If this 
is the case, those individuals who invest in social capital will expect higher 
returns and the coefficients for social capital variables should be biased 
upwards.
Note that these latter problems are probably more severe for friendship ties, 
while the first is related to membership in organizations. In neither case can we 
address the endogeneity problem directly. However, regarding membership in 
organizations we can rely on some indirect evidence. Since the SILC data 
contains members from the same household for many countries, we can 
estimate the effect of the spouse’s (or cohabitating partner’s) organizational 
membership instead of or alongside the respondent’s own organizational 
affiliation. It can be argued that the organizational membership of the 
partner is much less affected by the respondent’s income than his or her own 
organizational affiliation. At the same time, an individual can be assumed 
to have – at least partial – access to and utilize his or her spouse’s social 
connections. Thus the problem of endogeneity may be mitigated (though the 
spouse’s social capital is not perfectly exogenous either)8. Re-estimating our 
base model for the pooled sample and substituting the partner’s organizational 
affiliation for the respondent’s, or adding it to the model while retaining the 
respondent’s organizational membership variables as well provides further 
support to our results. When the respondent’s own organizational affiliations 
8  Note that this strategy does not work in the case of friendship ties. First, there is greater overlap 
between a person’s circle of friends and his/her partner’s circle of friends (than between the 
person’s organizational ties and his/her organizational ties). Second, social skills that might 
bias the estimated effect of friendship ties can also be assumed to go together within couples 
to some extent.
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are omitted (Table 5, top panel), the coefficients for the partner’s social capital 
are very similar to the coefficients for the respondent’s own social capital (for 
the latter, see Table 1). If the partner’s social capital is additionally included 
in the model, the effect is somewhat weaker and less precisely estimated, but 
is always positive and statistically significant for one type of organization 
and for two types for the female subsample (Table 5, bottom panel). These 
findings lend additional support to the statement that membership in 
organizations tends to increase income. However, caution is still required 
when assessing the observed association between social capital and income, 
especially regarding friendship ties. A possible reverse causation effect and/
or bias due to endogeneity cast some doubt on the casual interpretation of the 
estimated association between social capital and wage income.
Table 5 Estimated coefficients for the organizational membership of the partner
men women
base model
extended 
model
base model
extended 
model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
organizations: 1 type
0.0628*** 0.0456*** 0.0498*** 0.0357***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
organizations: 2 types
0.0444*** 0.0256*** 0.0431*** 0.0294***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
organizations: 3 or more types
0.0364*** 0.0246*** 0.0298*** 0.0143*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
org. membership of respondent no no no no
N 29252 29252 29225 29225
Adjusted R2 0.779 0.802 0.731 0.762
(5) (6) (7) (8)
organizations: 1 type
0.0320*** 0.0238** 0.0294*** 0.0248**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
organizations: 2 types
0.0141 0.00456 0.0232** 0.0190**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
organizations: 3 or more types
0.0111 0.00721 0.0110 0.00386
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
org. membership of respondent yes yes yes yes
N 29252 29252 29225 29225
Adjusted R2 0.780 0.803 0.731 0.762
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6. conclusions
Using the 2006 wave of the EU SILC dataset we analyzed the associations 
between individual social capital and wage income. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to assess the earnings effects of social 
capital in a multi-country context. We used three indicators to measure social 
capital: membership in voluntary organizations, the frequency of contacts 
with friends, and contacts with relatives. Our estimates revealed a significant 
positive association between social capital and wage income both for the 
pooled sample of 26 European countries and for the majority of the countries 
individually. 
Since possible reverse causation and bias due to endogeneity raise questions 
about the causal nature of the estimated association, we cannot claim that 
the results prove the effects of social capital on wage income. However, 
the estimation results are in line with this effect and indirect evidence 
regarding organizational affiliation provides further support for the casual 
interpretation.
The estimates also indicate considerable heterogeneity across countries in 
the earnings effects of social capital. The income effects of social capital seem 
to be more pronounced in post-socialist countries than in other EU member 
states (plus Norway and Iceland). In the group of post-socialist countries, 
both membership in voluntary organizations and the cultivation of friendship 
relationships are more rewarding in terms of higher income. Nevertheless, no 
difference was found in the income effect of kinship relationships between 
these groups of countries. 
Cross-country differences, however, not only prevail between the 
post-socialist and the other countries but also within the latter group. 
The individuality of the Nordic countries is highly apparent. Hardly any 
significant earnings effects were found in this group of countries. We can 
only hypothesize that this can be traced back to the more meritocratic nature 
of the labor market (i.e. recruitment and promotions) in these countries. At the 
other extreme is France, where all social capital proxies are significantly and 
positively associated with earnings.
We made an attempt to test the ‘strength of weak ties’ hypothesis as well. 
Our findings provide some support for this hypothesis. Weak ties, measured 
by the number of memberships in voluntary organizations, have significant 
and positive earnings effects in almost all countries. By contrast, the income 
effects of strong ties, measured by the intensity of contacts with relatives, 
proved to be significant in fewer countries and less robust even in those cases. 
The effect of friendship ties, covering both strong and weak ties, falls in-
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between; it is present in fewer countries than the effect of organizations, but 
more widespread than the effect of kinship ties.
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